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Utility Analysis: Current Trends and
Future Directions
Elizabeth F. Cabrera and Nambury S. Raju*
Utility analysis procedures offer organizational decision makers useful information regarding
the relative values of different interventions. Years of research have resulted in a number of
practically viable utility models and extensions. There is a continued need for research to
examine the accuracy of utility estimates and to further compare the different models. A more
recent research concern is that of low levels of acceptance of utility analysis results by
practitioners. Many researchers are turning their attention to ways in which this acceptance
may be increased. This article reviews different utility models as well as a number of important
extensions. It then discusses current utility analysis issues, such as the aforementioned
acceptance problem and the introduction of a multi attribute utility model. The article
concludes with suggestions for future utility analysis research.
Introduction
Utility analysis (UA) refers to a set of methods
and procedures that help organizational decision
makers choose among alternatives by providing
information regarding the relative values of
different interventions. UA was introduced more
than half a century ago (Brogden 1949).
However, it was used very little during the next
thirty years due to problems associated with the
estimation of a crucial variable in the model,
namely the standard deviation of job
performance in monetary units (SDY). Interest
in UA was renewed with the development of a
method for estimating SDY (Schmidt, Hunter,
McKenzie and Muldrow 1979).
Since then there has been a steady interest in
UA research. Other methods have been
proposed for estimating SDY (Cascio and Ramos
1986; Hunter and Schmidt 1982), Brogden’s
original UA model has been modified and
extended (Cronbach and Gleser 1965; Boudreau,
1983a, 1983b; Boudreau and Berger, 1985a,
1985b; De Corte 1994, 1996, 1998) and new UA
models have been developed (Raju, Burke and
Normand 1990; Raju, Cabrera and Lezotte 1996).
Despite these advances in UA methods,
organizational decision makers have resisted
the adoption of UA procedures in practice. In
response to this problem, researchers have
turned their attention to issues of acceptance of
UA recommendations by managers (Carson,
Becker and Henderson 1998; Cronshaw 1997;
Hazer and Highhouse 1997; Latham and Whyte
1994; Roth, Segars and Wright, 2000; Whyte
and Latham 1997) and to multi attribute UA
models (Roth and Bobko 1997).
Following a description of Brogden’s original
utility model and a careful examination of the
key variables, each of the formerly mentioned
contributions to UA research will be discussed.
The article then concludes with some recom
mendations for future research directions. Given
the nature of this special issue, the article will
focus on the utility of selection programs,
although the models and procedures reviewed
here are equally valid for other organizational
interventions such as training.
Brogden-Cronbach-Gleser Model
Most of the current work on UA is based on the
classical utility model developed by Brogden
(1949). While other models existed for
estimating the utility of selection procedures
(Sands 1973; Taylor and Russell 1939), none
allowed for the expression of utility in monetary
terms. Brogden proposed a formula to transform
the validity coefficient of a selection program
into an estimate of monetary value. His formula
was based on the assumption of a linear
relationship between a predictor score and the
monetary value of performance.
Cronbach and Gleser (1965) expanded
Brogden’s model to include the cost of testing
applicants. The resulting Brogden Cronbach
Gleser (BCG) model, which shows the
incremental utility or productivity gain of a
predictor based selection procedure over random
selection when Ns applicants are hired, can be
expressed as:
U  NsSDYrXYXs NC 1
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where SDY is the standard deviation of job
performance in monetary units (Y), rXY is the
correlation between the predictor (X) and YXs,
is the mean predictor score for the selectees, N is
the total number of applicants and C represents
the average cost per applicant of administering
the selection procedure.
In addition to the assumption of a linear
relationship between X and Y, this equation
assumes (mostly for convenience) that the
predictor score X is standardized, i.e. has a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of one. Two
additional assumptions allow for changes in the
equation that make it easier to apply in practice.
First, it is assumed that the correlation between
X and Y is equal to the correlation between X
and R, a rating of job performance. Thus, the
known value of the correlation between the
predictor score and a rating of job performance
can be substituted for the unknown correlation
between the predictor and the monetary value of
performance. Second, the assumption that the
predictor score X is normally distributed and
that selectees are hired top down makes the
direct calculation of Xs unnecessary. Given
these assumptions, the gain in utility may be
expressed as:
U  NsSDYrXR
p
NC 2
where rXR is the correlation between the
predictor and a rating of performance, p is the
proportion of applicants selected (top down) or
the selection ratio and  is the normal ordinate
associated with p.
It should be noted that these assumptions may
not always hold. Murphy (1986) presented
empirical evidence to show that the top
applicants do not always accept employment
offers. When this occurs, the true selection ratio
will be different given that the selectees are not
those with the highest predictor scores. On the
other hand, one of the more critical assumptions
of a linear relationship between X and Y has
been supported empirically (Hunter and Schmidt
1982).
As mentioned previously, UA was developed
as a decision aid to help professionals choose
among alternatives. Therefore, it is most often
used in situations where a decision must be made
between two different selection procedures. The
gain in utility of a new selection program over
that of an old program rather than over random
selection may be written as follows:
U  NsSDYr2 r1
p
NC2 C1 3
where r2 and r1 represent the correlations
between X and Y for the new (2) and old (1)
programs and, likewise, C2 and C1 represent the
average cost of administering the selection
procedure per applicant for the new and old
programs.
Key Variables
According to the BCG utility model, as Equation
1 shows, the utility of any selection program
depends on five key variables (Cabrera 1998).
These five variables are briefly described below.
Number of applicants accepted. Other things being
equal, the more applicants selected using a
particular selection procedure, the greater the
total utility. How many are hired at a given time
depends upon the needs of an organization. For
example, some organizations may be growing
faster than others and are, thus, more likely to
hire many new employees (and more often) than
slower growing organizations. Or some areas
within an organization may develop greater
staffing needs due to environmental changes or
strategic decisions. Also, some jobs may have
higher turnover rates than others, thus requiring
that new employees be hired more often. In
general, the utility of a selection procedure will
increase as staffing needs increase.
Standard deviation of performance in monetary units
(SDY). The difference in standard deviations
among different jobs depends on two major
factors. The first factor is the nature of the job.
Jobs differ in the degree to which employee
ability or motivation affects performance. That
is, some jobs are more sensitive to the efforts of
employees than others. This will depend to a
great extent on the amount of autonomy
employees have regarding how to perform the
work. Jobs characterized by strict routines and
procedures limit employee initiative and,
therefore, reduce the possibility of encountering
variance due to employee differences. For
example, assembly line workers are limited by
the assembly process so that two workers with
different abilities or motivation will still have
more or less the same performance. On the other
hand, the project leader of an advertising team
has much more freedom to decide how to carry
out the job, in which case there could be great
discrepancies in the performance of two team
leaders due to different levels of ability or
motivation.
Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch (1990)
conducted a study in which they showed that
SDY increases as a function of the level of job
complexity. As job complexity increases it
becomes more and more difficult to define
procedures by which the job should be
performed. Thus, it is likely that workers in
these jobs have more autonomy and are less
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constrained by rules and regulations. So,
complex jobs should be more sensitive to
employee differences and, therefore, as Hunter
et al. (1990) found, should have greater SDY s.
Another factor that influences SDY is the
relative value of a particular job to the
organization. There are some jobs in which
outstanding performance contributes greatly to
the financial success of a firm, whereas there are
other jobs in which the level of performance of
the employee may have very little impact on
organizational results. This depends on the
relative position of the job in the organization’s
value chain. Some jobs are vital for realizing the
strategic goals of the firm, while others are
clearly less important. Although performance
variance among employees in less important jobs
may exist, this variance does not translate into a
true difference in monetary terms for the
organization. So, other variables being equal,
jobs that have a larger SDY, either because they
are more complex and permit greater employee
discretion or because they have a more direct
impact on organizational results, will benefit
more from the use of valid selection procedures
than jobs with a lower SDY.
Validity coefficient. Selection procedures with
higher validity will have greater utility than
procedures with lower validity, other things
being equal. Therefore, a new selection
procedure, before it is seriously considered for
adoption, must have higher validity than the
current selection procedure.
Selectees’ mean predictor score. A higher mean
predictor score will lead to a higher utility. If all
of the applicants score poorly on a test
intended to predict future performance, even
selecting the ‘best’ will not contribute greatly
to the financial success of the organization.
Likewise, a smaller selection ratio will lead to
higher utility. Given the assumption of top
down selection, selecting a smaller number of
the top applicants (smaller selection ratio or
smaller p) will result in a higher mean test score
than selecting a larger number of applicants. It
should be noted, however, that in most
practical situations the number of new hires
will depend upon the needs of an organization.
When the number of new hires is fixed, the
selection ratio can only be reduced by
increasing the number of applicants, which, in
turn, could increase the overall cost of a new
selection program by increasing recruitment
costs.
Cost of the predictor and its administration. Utility
will be higher, all other factors being equal, when
the cost is lower. For example, the cost of a paper
pencil test is cheaper than an assessment center.
Explicitly dividing the influence of utility into
these five factors can be very useful for decision
makers. While most understand that utility is
affected by the validity of a selection procedure
as well as its cost, some may not be aware that
utility also depends on the job for which
employees are being selected and the number
and quality of the applicants. The fact that utility
is influenced by the job in question has clear
implications for decisions regarding selection
procedures. The use of valid selection procedures
for jobs that have a large SDY is essential. The
gain in utility from replacing an old selection
procedure with a new one of higher validity will
be greatest for jobs with higher SDY.
On the other hand, gains in total utility will
also be higher when the selection procedure is
used to select a large number of applicants. It is
often the case that the jobs requiring the greatest
number of employees are those that happen to
have a lower SDY. Thus, it is just as important to
use valid selection procedures for these jobs
given that the impact in total utility will be large
because so many selectees are affected.
Finally, recruiting efforts are important to
ensure a qualified group of applicants who will
contribute to a high mean predictor score. Also,
selection ratios should ideally be low, again so
that the mean test score is as high as possible. As
previously noted, this would require more
applicants, thus increasing the cost of
recruitment.
Table 1 shows the effect of differences in SDY,
increases in the validity coefficient and the
selection ratio on average utility gain per
selectee, assuming cost is held constant. One
can see that a new selection procedure which
provides a smaller gain in validity (.25) may
contribute to a higher utility gain (7,243 versus
3,139) than a procedure with a higher validity
increase (.65) due to the fact that the SDY is
greater (30,000 versus 5,000). Likewise, the
SDY rXY p  U
30000 .25 .40 7243
30000 .25 .70 3725
30000 .45 .40 13038
30000 .45 .70 6706
30000 .65 .40 18832
30000 .65 .70 9686
5000 .25 .40 1207
5000 .25 .70 621
5000 .45 .40 2173
5000 .45 .70 1118
5000 .65 .40 3139
5000 .65 .70 1614
Table 1: Average gain in utility per selectee as a
function of SDY, rXY and p.
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average gain in utility may be higher (1,614
versus 1,207) despite a higher selection ratio (.70
versus .40), due to a much greater gain in
validity (.65 versus .25).
Estimation of SDY
Three of the four variables called for by the BCG
model are typically readily available to
organizations. The only variable that is difficult
for decision makers to obtain is SDY. Problems
in estimating this variable prevented the BCG
model from becoming a practically viable tool
for over 25 years. Finally, Schmidt et al. (1979)
suggested a technique for estimating the
troublesome variable. Assuming that the mone
tary value of performance is normally
distributed, they pointed out that the difference
between the monetary value of an employee
who performs at the 85th percentile and an
employee who performs at the 50th percentile
was equal to SDY. Likewise, the difference
between an employee who performs at the
50th percentile and one who performs at the
15th percentile was also equal to the standard
deviation. Therefore, Schmidt et al. proposed
that supervisors estimate the monetary value of
performance for employees at the 15th, 50th and
85th percentiles. The average of the differences
between the 15th and 50th percentile estimates
and the 50th and 85th percentile estimates
should provide a reasonably accurate estimate of
SDY.
Following is an example of the instructions for
estimating the value of performance for a
computer programmer at the 85th percentile
that Schmidt et al. (1979) gave to supervisors in
their study:
We would now like for you to consider the
‘superior’ programmer. Let us define a superior
performer as a programmer who is at the 85th
percentile. That is, his or her performance is
better than that of 85% of his or her fellow
programmers, and only 15% turn in better
performances. Consider the quality and
quantity of the output typical of the superior
programmer. Then estimate the value of these
products and services. In placing an overall
dollar value on this output, it may again help
to consider what the cost would be of having
an outside firm provide these products and
services. Based on my experience, I estimate
the value to my agency of a superior
computer programmer to be dollars
per year.
Similar instructions were given for the
estimations of the value of performance at the
50th and 15th percentiles.
Cascio and Ramos (1986) offered an
alternative method for estimating the elusive
standard deviation. Their approach, known as
the Cascio Ramos estimate of performance in
dollars or CREPID, requires both a job analysis
and performance evaluation. The principal tasks
of the job are identified and weighted
according to importance. The weights are then
multiplied by average salary to determine the
monetary value of each principle task. These
values are then multiplied by the performance
rating that an employee receives for the
corresponding task. The resulting figures are
added to obtain the economic value of
performance for an employee. The mean and
standard deviation of the monetary value of
performance of all employees may then be
calculated (Cascio 1991).
Hunter and Schmidt (1982) also proposed
two quick and easy procedures for estimating
SDY. Based on a review of numerous studies
reporting employee output data, they
concluded that most estimates of SDY varied
between 40% and 70% of mean salary. Thus,
they recommend 40% and 70% of mean salary
as conservative (low) and liberal (high)
estimates, respectively, of SDY.
Several empirical studies have assessed the
validity of alternative procedures for estimating
SDY (Bobko, Karren and Kerkar 1987; Bobko,
Karren and Parkington 1983; Raju, Cabrera and
Lezotte 1996; Reilly and Smither 1985;
Weekly, Frank, O’Connor and Peters 1985). A
typical finding has been a large variation
among the percentile estimates of supervisors.
That is, supervisors often give very different
values for the same percentile. This is not only
a problem for the validity of utility estimates
but may also be one of the factors which
negatively affects decision makers’ perception
of the value of utility estimates.
Burke and Frederick (1986) proposed a
modification of the Schmidt et al. procedure
that helps to reduce the variation among
percentile estimates. Following this procedure,
supervisors estimate only the 50th percentile.
The average of these estimates is then provided
to the supervisors who go on to estimate the
remaining two percentiles.
Another common finding from studies of the
estimation of SDY is that the 40% method and
CREPID tend to produce similar estimates of
SDY, while the Schmidt et al. procedure tends
to produce much higher estimates. This is not
surprising given that both the 40% method and
CREPID are based on average salary. Finally, in
a study of managers’ reactions to UA, Hazer
and Highhouse (1997) found that in comparing
the three popular methods for estimating SDY,
managers perceived UA as being more credible
and were most likely to use it when SDY was
estimated using the 40% method.
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BCG Extensions and Other Utility
Models
Several extensions and variations of the BCG
model have been proposed. These modifications
were designed to incorporate typical business
accounting practices as well as to address some
of the assumptions underlying the BCG model.
These are briefly described in this section.
BCG Extensions
In studying the BCG model of utility, Boudreau
(1983a) concluded that key economic variables
had been excluded. Specifically, the utility
equation did not take into account the effects
of variable costs, taxes and discounting. Not
considering these economic factors, according to
Boudreau, causes utility estimates to be
upwardly biased. He points out that variable
costs rise (fall) as productivity rises (falls).
Therefore, a portion (V) of the gain in profits
must be used to cover increased costs such as:
variable raw materials costs, variable production
overhead, benefits, and incentive or commission
based pay. Likewise, a reduction in profits will be
somewhat offset by a reduction in variable costs.
Furthermore, a portion (TAX) of organizational
profits must be used to pay taxes for those
organizations facing tax liabilities. Finally, the
opportunity costs of returns forgone when costs
and benefits accrue over time should be
accounted for by discounting the value of future
costs and benefits. An extended version of the
BCG equation (Equation 2) that reflects these
economic considerations can be expressed as:
U  Ns
XT
t 1
1
1 ii SDYt1 Vt1 TAXt
"
rXY

p

NC1 TAX 4
where i is the discount rate, Vt is the proportion
of profits represented by variable costs for time
period t, TAXt is the organization’s applicable
tax rate for time period t, and t is the time period
in which a productivity increase occurs.
Assuming that TAX, V, SDY and rXY remain
constant over time, the gain in utility of one
selection procedure over another (i.e., an
extension of Equation 3) may be written as:
U  NsSDY1 V1 TAXr2 r1
pXT
t 1
1
1 it

NC2 C11 TAX 5
In addition to suggesting the inclusion of key
economic variables in models of utility,
Boudreau (1983b) also encouraged consideration
of the impact of employee flow into and out of
the workforce on utility estimates. Utility
models had typically assumed that selection
programs only affected one group of selectees.
In reality, these programs are usually used
numerous times, in some cases continuously,
and thus affect many groups, with the impact of
the programs lasting for a number of years.
Employee flow is an important consideration
because utility is affected by changes in the
number of employees in the workforce who
were chosen by a particular selection program.
Boudrea (1983b) demonstrated that the use of
modified utility equations which include both the
effects of the three key economic variables as
well as employee flow may result in greater
utility estimates than previously reported.
Boudreau and Berger (1985) extended the idea
of employee flow even further by considering
different types of employee movement in and
out of an organization. Specifically, they address
the following scenarios: (1) repeated hiring
without separations; (2) repeated hiring with
separations not being replaced over time; and (3)
repeated hiring with separations replaced over
time. The last scenario is the most general one
and also the most realistic from a practitioner’s
point of view. It allows one to see the explicit
link between utility based on the BCG model
and utility associated with the separation of
employees for unsatisfactory performance on the
job during the probationary period and
replacement with new hires.
Following up on the work of Boudreau and
Berger, De Corte examined, in several recent
articles (1994, 1996, 1998), the question of total
utility of a selection program with a proba
tionary period. De Corte’s research deals with
the problem of choosing among alternative
predictors for selecting a single group of new
employees with the stipulation that some of
these employees may be terminated later for
unsatisfactory job performance. He first
addresses the problem of a single cohort group
(De Corte 1994) and later expands it to include
multiple cohort groups as well recruitment costs
(De Corte 1996). The incorporation of
recruitment costs extends previous work done
by Martin and Raju (1992) and Law and Myors
(1993). Finally, he expands the work of
Cronbach and Gleser (1965) on two stage
selection to include multiple stage selection (De
Corte 1998).
Other Utility Models
We now turn to two utility models developed in
response to concerns about some of the
assumptions underlying the BCG model.
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Raju, Burke and Normand model. Raju, Burke and
Normand (1990) proposed a new utility analysis
model (RBN) that does not require the
problematic estimation of SDY. Instead, the
model introduces two new variables: average
total compensation, A, which includes the salary,
benefits, bonuses, and direct overhead allocated
to an average employee and the standard
deviation of a rating of job performance, SDR.
The gain in utility of a new selection procedure
over an old procedure according to the RBN
model may be expressed as:
U  NsASDRrXR
p
NC 6
Although the RBN model eliminates the
estimation of SDY, it does often require that
the original performance rating scale be
transformed into a new performance scale. This
is necessary because the metric of any
performance rating is arbitrary and may,
therefore, unduly influence overall utility. Three
different procedures for transforming the original
performance scale were developed by Burke,
Raju, Edwards and Day (1993).
Lezotte, Raju, Burke and Normand (1996)
conducted a study to compare the RBN model
with the BCG model. The results showed that
the utility estimate derived using the RBN model
was closer to a utility estimate based on an
empirically derived SDY than was the estimate
derived using a modified CREPID procedure,
which was lower, and the estimate based on
Schmidt et al.’s procedure, which was higher. In
another study by Raju et al. (1996), utility
estimates derived using the RBN model were
higher than estimates based on the CREPID and
the Schmidt et al. procedures.
Raju, Cabrera and Lezotte model. Both the BCG
and RBN models are based on the implicit
assumption that employee performance ratings
are continuous. Bobko, Karren and Kerkar (1987)
argued that this assumption is not always
tenable. More often than not employee
performance ratings are made using categorical
scales such as 1 to 5. In response to this criticism,
Raju, Cabrera and Lezotte (1996) developed a
new utility model (RCL) in which performance is
viewed as categorical rather than continuous. A
special case of this model is the dichotomous
utility model in which the number of categories
is limited to two. For example, the two
categories could be meeting requirements/not
meeting requirements of the job or successful/
unsuccessful on the job.
The RCL model is based on logistic
regression, which is recommended over linear
regression when one variable is continuous, X,
and the other is dichotomous, Y (Agretsi 1984;
Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). According to the
model, P1 is the probability that an employee
with a given predictor score, X, belongs to the
successful group and may be expressed as:
P1  P1jX  e
aXb
1 eaXb 7
where a and b are the multiplicative and additive
factors, respectively, to be determined, and e is a
mathematical constant. The probability that a
person with a given X belongs to the
unsuccessful group, P0, may be written as:
P0  P0jX  1 P1  1
1 eaXb 8
The average gain in utility of a new selection
procedure (II) over an old procedure (I) may be
expressed as:
U  Y1 Y0PII1 PI1 9
where Y1 is the estimated monetary value of an
average successful employee, Y0 is that of an
average unsuccessful employee and PII1 and
PI1 are the average probabilities of success
(given selection) for the new and old selection
procedures, respectively.
Like the RBN model, the RCL model does not
require the difficult estimation of SDY. However,
it does require that supervisors estimate the
monetary value of an average successful
employee and of an average unsuccessful
employee. These estimates may be easier for
supervisors to provide than the percentile
estimates required for the Schmidt et al.
procedure because they more closely mirror
supervisors’ perceptions of employee perfor
mance. For example, Karren and Bobko (1983)
found that some supervisors were unwilling or
unable to make distinctions between employees
at the 50th and the 85th percentiles. They
considered that employees were either meeting
requirements (successful) or not meeting require
ments (unsuccessful). In cases where supervisors
perceive employee performance to be
categorical, the RCL model may be appropriate.
Current Trends in UA Research
UA Acceptance
Much recent UA research has shifted the focus
of study from the measures to issues of
acceptance of utility recommendations (Carson,
Becker and Henderson 1998; Cronshaw 1997;
Hazer and Highhouse 1997; Latham and Whyte
1994; Whyte and Latham 1997). Some of the
findings have been disappointing for proponents
of UA. A study by Latham and Whyte (1994)
revealed that the presentation of utility data
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regarding a proposed selection procedure
actually reduced manager support for the
program. That is, managers were less likely to
support the implementation of a new selection
procedure when given information about the
utility of the program than when utility infor
mation was not presented. Managers reacted
more favorably when presented with
information regarding the validity of the selec
tion procedure or validity plus expectancy table
information.
Whyte and Latham (1997) hypothesized that,
given the positive impact of source credibility on
message believability, the negative findings of
their previous study could possibly be eliminated
if an expert explained UA to the managers. A
replication of their own study including a new
scenario in which an expert explained UA and
was available to answer questions again found
that managers were less likely to support a new
selection program when utility information was
provided.
An interesting commentary on Whyte and
Latham’s study was made by Cronshaw (1997),
who acted as the expert in their study. Cronshaw
suggested that the utility information that he
presented may well have been perceived as more
of a high pressure or coercive communication
rather than a neutral message intended to inform.
He proposed that managers’ negative reactions
to this attempt to ‘sell’ the selection intervention
could have caused the results. Cronshaw
concluded that managers are more likely to
accept UA as a decision tool when it serves an
informational rather than a persuasive purpose.
In fact, not all studies of UA acceptance have
resulted in negative reactions. Hazer and
Highhouse (1997) presented managers with
different UA scenarios and found that their
perceptions of the usefulness of UA were above
the midpoint for all scenarios. They also found
that managers had more favorable reactions
toward UA when the 40% method was used to
estimate SDY. In another replication of Latham
and Whyte’s study, Beckstein and Gilliland
(1996) used exactly the same materials and
failed to find lower acceptance when UA
information was presented. In a second study
they revised the UA materials to make them
more ‘user friendly’ and found that this
information was more favorably viewed than
validity information alone or validity plus
original utility information.
This conclusion was corroborated by Carson,
Becker and Henderson (1998) who replicated
Latham and Whyte’s original study using MBA
students. They included an additional scenario in
which utility information was presented in a
more understandable way. Results revealed low
to moderate positive effects for this type of
utility information on levels of acceptance. They
concluded that the manner in which utility
information is presented could affect the
potential acceptance of UA recommendations.
These studies raise a number of issues to be
investigated regarding the acceptance of UA
recommendations. Most of the conclusions have
suggested that the way in which UA information
is presented is an important factor for
acceptance. More ‘user friendly’ explanations of
UA have resulted in more positive reactions.
Also, presenting UA in an informational rather
than a persuasional manner may also help to
increase acceptance of UA recommendations. In
concluding, it should be noted that, while several
studies have failed to replicate the negative UA
reactions found by Latham and Whyte, none of
them has found high levels of support by
managers for UA. At best low to moderate
levels of acceptance have been encountered.
Multi Attribute UA
Another possible factor influencing the
acceptance of UA may be that an estimate of
the monetary value of selection programs is not
always the only information that managers are
interested in when making their decisions.
Macan and Highhouse (1994) reported that
managers often do not request information
regarding the monetary value of HR activities.
Multi attribute utility (MAU) models are utility
models which incorporate multiple outcomes or
attributes, not just the value of job performance,
into the decision making process. MAU allows
decision makers to evaluate a number of decision
options by considering the effects of each option
on various attributes or outcomes that may be
important to the organization (Boudreau 1991).
MAU analysis requires that decision makers
first make a list of attributes that they consider
important for making the final choice among
selection procedures. Roth and Bobko (1997)
present an example of a selection system for
which relevant attributes include diversity, legal
exposure and organizational image in addition to
increased value of job performance. Each of the
chosen attributes is measured and combined into
a single composite number that represents the
benefit for each of the possible selection
procedures.
There are often multiple factors that influence
organizational decisions. Kaplan and Norton
(1996) illustrate this point by describing a
cockpit of a jet airplane that has only one
instrument measuring ‘airspeed’. They question
how the reader would feel about flying on that
plane. Even if the pilot did an excellent job on
airspeed, how could he avoid colliding with tall
mountains or running out of fuel? Clearly pilots
need information from a large set of indicators to
navigate an airplane. Organizational decision
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makers also need to consider more than one
piece of information when choosing among
alternatives. While the value of performance in
monetary units will surely continue to be one of
the most important attributes in any decision
making process within organizations, MAU
models offer decision makers the possibility of
including other important outcomes in their
utility equation.
Decision Making Processes
The aforementioned studies regarding UA
acceptance have made the need to better
understand the decision making processes of
managers another area of interest for UA
researchers. Boudreau pointed out that, ‘UA
models offer normative theories about the
factors that decision makers should consider in
making HRM decisions, but actual decisions
probably depart from UA prescriptions’ (1991, p.
710).
A promising advance toward understanding
the decision making process as it relates to UA
acceptance comes from the work of Roth, Segars
and Wright (2000). They define the domain of
UA acceptance and then present a theoretical
perspective that helps to delineate constructs
and suggest future research directions. An
important distinction the authors make is
between the ‘pre use domain’ of UA acceptance,
in which decision makers decide whether or not
to conduct a UA, and the ‘post use domain’, in
which decision makers choose whether or not to
accept the recommendations once UA has been
implemented. The acceptance studies up to date
have clearly focused on the post use domain.
Finally, Roth et al. (2000) use Image Theory, a
behavioral theory of decision making in
organizations developed by Beach and Mitchell
(1996), to analyse the process decision makers
go through when deciding whether or not to
conduct a UA. They then draw on dual process
theories from the persuasion literature to analyse
post use decisions to accept UA results.
Participation
Many researchers have argued that allowing
decision makers to participate in the utility
analysis process will increase acceptance of UA
results. Roth et al. (2000) mentioned the positive
effect that participation has been found to have
on the acceptance of numerous organizational
interventions. Participation may lead to higher
levels of acceptance because individuals have
greater knowledge of the issue under consider
ation and/or because commitment to an issue
tends to be greater when individuals participate
in its planning or design. Likewise, Roth and
Bobko (1997) suggested that a potential
advantage of MAU models is that they require
the participation of decision makers in choosing,
measuring and weighing the relevant attributes.
They stated that this participation would likely
increase acceptance of the final recom
mendations. Rauschenberger and Schmidt
(1987, p. 55) proposed that one way to increase
the perceived credibility of UA results was to
‘get organizational decision makers involved in
the utility analysis at the earliest possible time.’
Finally, Morrow, Jarrett and Rupinski (1997)
reported a positive effect of participation on the
acceptance of UA results in their four year
investigation of the utility of one organization’s
corporate wide training. In their case, a multi
attribute utility model based on the RBN model
was modified and approved by managers in a
series of meetings previous to the application of
the model. The authors concluded that managers
accepted the utility estimates due to managerial
pre approval of the utility model and because
the managers were ‘able to identify and control
the parameters that were included in the multi
attribute utility model’ (Morrow et al. 1997, p.
114).
Strategic UA
The instigation of the previously mentioned
utility investigation conducted by Morrow et al.
(1997) was a request by the organization’s CEO
for a report of the monetary value of training.
The CEO indicated that training should be
aligned with the organization’s strategic goals
and should be experimentally evaluated in order
to show that it was a worthwhile investment.
There is a clear trend among organizations to
question the strategic contribution of their
human resource interventions (Huselid, Jackson
and Schuler 1997; Ulrich 1997; Wright and
McMahan 1992). In response to this demand,
Cabrera and Cabrera (1999) proposed a strategic
utility analysis model. Using the MAU
framework, which considers multiple outcomes
in the analysis of utility, the authors suggest that
the specific outcomes included should come
directly from the management control frame
work an organization uses to assess its strategic
performance. In this way UA methods
incorporate the same indicators of success that
the rest of the organization uses. These
indicators may include anything from customer
satisfaction to sales growth to production errors.
This kind of UA procedure will provide decision
makers with information regarding the relative
contributions of different selection alternatives
toward the achievement of the organization’s
strategic objectives.
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Future Directions for UA Research
Accuracy of UA Estimates
While there are many models for assessing the
utility of a selection program or an
organizational intervention, there is very little
reported research on the accuracy of utility
analysis estimates. Alexander and Barrick (1987)
proposed some approximate standard errors for
utility estimates, and Anderson and Muchinsky
(1991) and Quartetti and Raju (1998) reported
some Monte Carlo results on the distribution of
utility estimates.
The results of Quartetti and Raju’s (1998)
study showed that sample size did not affect
average utility estimates, whereas utility
estimates were found to increase as both the
population validity increases and as the predictor
distribution becomes more negatively skewed.
Utility estimates also increased as the selection
ratio decreased. Finally, for all of the analyses,
estimates based on the RCL model were more
accurate and had less variability than those based
on the BCG model.
While these studies are important, more
research is still needed to develop appropriate
standard errors of various utility estimates.
Without some indication of the degree of
accuracy associated with the currently popular
utility estimates, it may be difficult to take such
estimates very seriously.
Accuracy of SDY Estimation
Although several empirical studies have
compared the Schmidt et al. (1979) procedure
with the CREPID procedure in estimating SDY,
the accuracy of these estimates is still an
unanswered question. Based on these empirical
studies, we appear to have gained a general
understanding of how the different estimates of
SDY compare with one another, but no such
understanding is currently available regarding
the accuracy of the SDY estimates. One study
regarding the robustness of SDY estimates
(Anderson and Muchinsky 1991) did find that
SDY estimates using Schmidt et al.’s (1979)
percentile estimates were fairly robust; that is
they were not strongly affected by departures
from normality.
Thus, there is a definite need for a
comprehensive assessment of the reliability and
validity/accuracy of the SDY estimates. The
number of managers typically involved in
estimating SDY is rather small in both the
Schmidt et al. (1979) and CREPID procedures. At
the present time, very little is known about the
effect of these small sample sizes on the
estimation of SDY. Bobko et al. (1987) have
previously emphasized the need for such an
empirical investigation.
UA Acceptance
As noted earlier, the acceptability of UA results
by managers should not be taken for granted.
UA researchers have attributed low levels of
acceptance by managers and other consumers of
UA results to a lack of understanding of the UA
framework, its assumptions, and its terminology.
UA proponents have argued for a need to adopt
the commonly accepted business accounting
terminology in describing UA results. Most also
agree that acceptance levels can be increased by
getting managers involved upfront in the
formulation of appropriate, company wide
strategies for the development and imple
mentation of multi attribute organizational
interventions and the assessment of their utility.
But perhaps getting managers to better
understand UA is not the only problem. UA
researchers should also attempt to better
understand decision makers’ needs. Rather than
trying to ‘sell’ UA methods to managers, UA
proponents should first ask them what information
they want when they are making decisions.
Maybe UA procedures are not accepted because
they do not offer managers what they want.
Remember that Macan and Highhouse (1994)
found that many HR managers are not interested
in the monetary value of their interventions. In
fact, there is a general trend in the area of
management control towards incorporating
multiple, non financial indicators of success when
assessing organization wide performance (Kaplan
and Norton 1992).
Current UA methods and procedures may be
extremely useful if they are adapted to provide
decision makers with the information that they
consider to be important. MAU methods are a
step in this direction. Why not use UA
procedures to show managers which selection
procedure will provide the greatest increase in
customer satisfaction or the greatest reduction in
errors, if that is what they want to know?
A Comparison of Models
While there is a great deal of empirical data
concerning the BCG model, there is only limited
information on how the new models (RBN and
RCL) compare with the BCG model in terms of
their utility estimates. There is a need for
systematic investigation of the various models
(including the BCG extensions proposed by
Boudreau and Berger (1985a, 1985b) and De
Corte (1994, 1996, 1998)) with respect to
implementation problems and the congruence
of utility estimates. Such investigations are
essential if we are to take full advantage of the
various utility models and for generating greater
acceptance of the utility models among
managers and business executives.
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Conclusion
Organizational decision makers need decision
aids to help them evaluate the relative contri
butions of different selection programs. Utility
analysis models offer concrete procedures for
evaluating the monetary impact of selection
options. Extensions of the traditional UA models
and the development of new models have made
UA more readily applicable for practitioners.
Given that managers are now faced with a
number of alternative UA methods, it is impor
tant that these alternatives be further investi
gated to provide clearer evidence regarding the
accuracy of their respective estimates.
Another key issue for UA research is that of
acceptance. Involving managers in the utility
analysis process appears to play a vital role in
UA acceptance. Efforts are being made to better
understand the managerial decision making
processes that influence when managers choose
to apply UA models and under what circum
stances they are more likely to accept the final
UA recommendations. Again, maybe a more
fruitful direction for UA research would be to
determine what information managers want
when they are making decisions and to
incorporate this information into current UA
models. By allowing for the inclusion of a
number of outcomes in the analysis of
alternatives, multi attribute utility models are a
step in this direction.
In summary, while UA researchers have come
far in developing practical, realistic procedures
for assessing the relative impact of diverse
selection procedures, there is still much to be
done. Issues of applicability, accuracy and
acceptance abound. There continue to be
opportunities for research in comparing different
models and testing the accuracy of SDY and
utility estimates. Meanwhile there is exciting
new ground to be covered regarding how to
increase the use and acceptance of utility models
by managers or possibly how to reorient current
UA models so that they provide decision makers
with the information they need and want.
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